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In this article, we provide some insights into the labor market effects of fixed-term contracts 
in  Spain.  We  use  in  our study the dual labor market theory and  some tenets of efficiency wage 
models.  First, we discuss various relevant implications of the introduction of fixed-term contracts 
for the Spanish labor market outcomes. Then, we undertake the empirical analysis. This has shown 
evidence  of significant  linkages  between  firms'  use  of fixed-term  contracts  and  an  increasing 
segmentation  of  the  Spanish  labor  market.  Specifically,  firms  seem  to  use  the  temporary 
(  employment relationship to screen workers, elicit greater efforts from them and optimize a core of 
employees.  Our finding, that the use of fixed-term contracts is correlated with lower labor costs, 
indicates that a more efficient mechanism to recruit and allocate labor may be in place. To produce 
this  outcome,  wages  need  not  be  discriminated.  The  reason  being  that  firms  can  assign 
heterogeneous workers to perform heterogeneous tasks. Moreover, primary sector jobs (permanent 
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This article addresses how the new rules governing the workplace in  Spain  might have 
significantly affected the functioning of the Spanish labor market. We  will focus on the 
introduction of fixed-term employment contracts to the labor law, to show that it has provided 
incentives for a increased labor market segmentation. We obtain some results which seem to 
support this hypothesis. On the other hand, we present empirical evidence of reductions in  labor 
costs but not in labor productivity among firms that use fixed-term employment contracts more 
intensively. It suggests that more flexible employment relations, posed by fixed-term 
employment contracts, favor higher economic efficiency, at least from a short-run perspective.' 
More particularly, the following questions will be examined: Who are the workers in 
temporary contracts? Do they earn  more or lesa than permanent workers? Are temporary 
workers more or less productive than permanent workers? How Iikely are temporary workers to 
become permanent?  Is what we observe in the labor market greater flexibility or enhanced 
segmentation? Is there an  optimum proportion of temporary workers for each firm? The objective 
of this article is to take some initial steps to answer these and other questions. They raise 
important issues concerning the dynamics of the Spanish labor market over the last five years 
and its future developments. 
The fixed-term employment contract was first introduced to Spanish labor law by the 
Worker Statute of 1980. It has been considered a restricted alternative to the "normal" indefinite 
contracto  In the latter case, the worker is protected against unfair dismissal.
2  The Worker 
Statute Amendment of 1984 was intended  to encourage new job creation (Employment 
Promotion Program/EPP), allowing firms to hire workers under fixed-term contracts in  more 
varied circumstances and with few applied restrictions. 
1  A  highly segmented  labor market may have  in  the long  run  adverse  effects on  economic 
performance.  Persistence of job insecurity can  reduce  workers'  motivation and,  therefore,  labor 
productivity. A low committed labor force makes it more difficult to implement new values in firms' 
personnel practices, as those of labor-management cooperation, team work and higher responsibility 
in job tasks. 
2 If the dismissal is fair, the worker has no right to severance compensation. If the dismissal is 
judicially declared unfair, the worker receives a severance payment of 45 days salary for every year 
of service, up to a maximum of 42 months. 2 
Basad  on the principie of promoting employment, firms can  hire unemployed workers 
who are registered in the Employment Office for a mínimum period of six months. This fíxed­
( 
term contract can  be renewed up to three years.  After a worker has completed three years of 
employment with the same firm, continued employment implies that the employee automatically 
becomes permanent.  If the fixed-term contract expires and the worker becomes unemployed, he 
or she receives severance pay of twelve days' salary per year of service. The  same  worker, 
whose contract has expired, cannot be employed with the same firm under the Employment 
Promotíon Program until one year has passed.  When a worker has been  laid-off or unfairly 
dismissed, the firm cannot replace that worker with a fixed-term employee until after one year 
from the time of termination. Moreover, the law prohibits a firm from filling a vacancy with a 
fixed-term worker if the vacancy resulted from another fixed-term contract which expired in the 
previous year and lasted the allowed maximum duration. 
e 
In its spirit, the fixed-term contract ofters a legal alternative to the presumed rigidity 
placed in the employment relationship by the permanent contracto  In the midst of massive 
unemployment,3 fixed-term contracts were meant to ease adjustment costs and foster new 
e	  hiring. Interestingly, since  1985 the Spanish economy has enjoyed high levels of growth, and 
the creation of new jobs has been impressive by most standards. Concurrent with this process 
of employment recovery, the increase in the number of temporary workers (those with a fixed­
term contract) has been  remarkable.  In  1987, 14.4% of wage and salary workers held fixed­
( 
term contracts; by 1990 the percentage had climbed to 29.8%. Most workers who have moved 
into new jobs in the last five years were hired as temporary employees at first instance. As a 
result, labor turnover has increased substantially too. 
(  As stated earlier, fixed-term contracts were intended to help increase labor market 
flexibility by facilitating hiring and firing practices, and reducing the costs of dismissals. The 
reasons for such institutional change were grounded in the necessity to correct what, according 
to some economists (Dolado and  Malo de Molina 1985), was a very rigid labor market. 
e 
3  In 1985, about 22% of the labor force was unemployed, showing an increase by as much as 
19 percentage points since 1975. 3 
Excessively protective labor laws have been blamed for the lack of new job creation, after an 
intense labor shedding in the late seventies. About two million jobs were lost from the mid-70s 
e 
to the mid-80s. Since then, the number of employed workers has steadily increased to reach the 
employment level of 1975, although the unemployment rate remains high, mainly due to the 
notable ¡ncrease of female labor force participation. In  1990, about 30% of wage and salary 
(~  i	  workers had  a fixed-term contracto  Yet, despite that stunning figure, we do not know the extent 
to which a new, less protective labor law, and the consequent growth of temporary 
employment, may be responsible for the creation of new jobs. 
It is evident, however, that the fixed-term contract law of 1984 has profoundly affected 
the employment relationship in Spain. Job security has notably eroded because firms have 
overwhelmingly resorted to fixed-term contracts for new employees. As a result, the number of 
permanent workers has remained steady since  1987, in spite of increased employment. This 
( 
suggests that firms are converting fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts with the 
primary purpose of generating or replacing a core of employees. However, firms' favorable 
response to the new labor legislation indicates that the changes in the institutional framework 
have been effective in establishing more flexible rules for the employment relationship.4 
In the following section, we seek to provide the framework that will help us understand 
the labor market effects of the fixed-term employment contracts institution in Spain. The rest of 
the article is devoted to provide the empirical evidence. 
( 
2. Conceptual framework 
The observations made in the introduction lead us to think of the dual labor market 
e	  theory as a useful basic framework to better understand the effects of fixed-term contract 
legislation on recent labor market developments in Spain. The dual labor market theory, 
complemented by more recent advances in labor economics, will provide us with the appropriate 
4  The successful implementation of the Employment Promotion Program has been facilitated by 
other economic  factors that are  less  relevant to our discussion  at hand.  For  example,  Spain's 
integration ¡nto the European  Economic Community in  1986 and  the general good  health of the 




tools to examine whether fixed-term contract legislation has indeed brought about more 
flexibility or higher segmentation to the Spanish labor market.  More specifically, we resort to 
some theoretical tenets of the efficiency wage models of the labor market. We concentrateon 
the shirking model, which provides a rationale for the existence of dual labor markets.
6 
The dual labor market theory maintains that there are two distinct labor markets: one of 
low-paid jobs, bad  working conditions, unstable employment and little opportunity for 
advancement (secondary); and other of higher wages, better working conditions, more stable 
employment and opportunities for advancement (primary).  In the secondary sector, the 
accumulation and returns to human capital are almost nonexistent, compared with the primary 
sector, where an internallabor market exists lDoeringer and  Piore  1971). A crucial tenet of the 
dual labor market theory is that the primary sector jobs are rationed. 
In line with the predictions of the dual labor market theory, we can observe significant 
differences between jobs pertaining to both sectors of the labor market. However, formal tests 
for the validation of the theory based on those differences have been difficult (Dickens and Lang 
1985). Furthermore, the extent to which primary jobs are rationed becomes a key issue: are 
there workers who, possessing the adequate qualifications, cannot find a job in the primary  e 
sector? The job rationing in the primary sector has not yet been satisfactorily assessed. 
In the empirical work, the criteria for assigning workers to either the primary or 
secondary sectors for analyzing their job characteristics present major probJems.  This is 
( 
particularly true when the taxonomy is made according to the occupation or industry where the 
workers are employed. Workers' choice of occupation and industry might be correlated with 
unmeasured characteristics. Moreover, workers' selection tends to bias the results toward the 
(  predictions of the dual labor market theory. 
Suppose we discover an exogenous factor that generates two clusters of workers. By 
6 The shirking model is based on the principie that monitoring workers is costly. It is profitable 
for the firm to pay wages in  excess of that prevailing in the market to elicit greater effort from 
workers. Increasing wages raise the cost of losing a job and creates an incentive for workers not 
to shirk. See Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984 for the shirking model, and Katz 1986 for a thorough survey 
of efficiency wage models. 5 
analyzing the characteristics associated with each group of workers, we may gauge whether 
e 
they present significant differences. If they do, we can assume that each  group belongs to a 
different labor market. The next step in the analysis consists of ascertaining whether those two 
labor markets resemble the dual labor market hypotheses. The enactment of the fixed-term 
contract legislation constitutes the referred exogenous factor. The kind of contract a worker has 
(1 
may be informative of the characteristics associated with the job he or she performs, thereby 
providing us with a natural test for the dual labor market theory in Spain. 
The fixed-term contract law allows firms to employ workers under two different regimes: 
permanent employment and temporary employment. Permanent workers can  be thought of as 
employees engaged in  long-term employment, enjoying the advantages of promotíon ladders and 
other incentive schemes. Temporary workers under the Employment Promotion Program are 
usually hired for a short period of time. After a fixed-term contract ends, three outcomes are 
possi~le:  the worker joins the firm as a permanent employee, the contract is renewed or the 
worker has to leave the firm to seek work elsewhere after receiving an insignificant severance 
pay (see note 2). 
e  Two characteristics of fixed-term contracts are salient: first, the firm avoids the cost and 
potential Iiability in  laying-off employees. Thus, the firm protects itself from onerous Iitigation 
and the adverse effect on reputation of frequent firing. Second, the worker is bound to the firm 
for the employment period stipulated in the contracto This reduces firm's uncertainty with regard 
to the possibility of workers quitting the jobo  Clearly, the employment adjustment costs are 
notably reduced. s 
The reduced costs in labor force adjustment for the firm have important implicatíons for 
personnel practices within the firm and the functioning of the labor market.
7  The massive use of 
s That firms are  in a position to employ fixed·term  workers also  implies that they can  make 
greater investments in  permanent workers.  The  reason  for this is  that there is  less  uncertainty 
el  associated  with such  investments, particularly when employment adjustments in  slumps can  be 
carried out inexpensively through temporary workers. 
7  From a macroeconomic perspective, we may observe a more responsive labor demand in the 





fixed-term contracts in  Spain over the past five years indicates that firms may achieve a more 
advantageous position by increasing the proportion of temporary employees.  However, those 
advantages cannot be solely attributed to adjustment cost reductions. 
In  an  economy, where fixed-term contracts become available by law, there is  little 
incentive for the firm to hire a new employee as permanent. The firm will necessarily adapt its 
recruiting policies to the new provision for fixed-term contracts. It is evident that fixed-term 
contracts are going to be  used to sort out workers eligible for permanent employment. Thus, 
temporary contracts become a screening mechanism for the firm to establish long-term 
employment relationships.8 
Furthermore, temporary workers' expectations to become permanent employees exert on 
those workers the effects of a discipline device that prevents them from shirking.
1l  That 
happens because there are queues for indefinite contracts10 and only those workers who put 
forth maximum efforts are likely to obtain a permanent contracto  Alternatively, more committed 
workers are,  at least, more Iikely to be given the option of renewing their fixed-term contracts. 
Workers who are more adverse to short-term jobs will work harder to gain stable single-firm 
employment in  which they can learn more and  be more productive. In the interest of the firm, 
this is a relatively inexpensive way to screen workers11  and becomes a costless mechanism for 
particularly those  resulting  from  hiring  and  firing-- on  the  level  of employment  are  not readily 
apparent (Bentolilla and  Bertola 1990 and  Bertola 19901. 
8 In  some sectors,  by the  nature of jobs,  temporary employment becomes necessary  in  the 
production process. 
11  The guaranteed contract duration may induce workers to shirk. That can explain why shorter 
duration contracts are  more  frequent.  We  will conclude  later that firms  will monitor temporary 
workers more closely than other workers. 
10 Although it may be possible that fixed-term contracts are desirable to some workers. 
11  The difference between this method of screening and that based on a probationary period is 
that a particular fixed-term contract can be extended up to a maximum of three years. The sooner 
the firm observes the desired characteristics in the worker, the more readily that worker is offered 
a permanent contracto  Sometimes, those desired characteristics are so evident that the worker is 
employed by permanent contract at first instance. This can also happen if more qualified workers 








eliciting greater effons from employees. 
A relevant Question follows: How does the existence of temporary workers affect the 
performance of permanent employees? If temporary workers experience hígh turnover, thereby 
increasing job vacancies,  permanent workers are more likely to loaf because the losses from 
being fired in terms of finding another job are lower. '2 However, the costs associated with 
separation from long-term employment are high if the returns to increased tenure are  high too. If 
the returns to tenure are correlated with the specific human capital and the job match (Medoff 
and Abraham  1980 and Jovanovic 1979), the badly matched and  wíth less specific human 
capital workers are the most Iikely to end in dismissal or Quitting. This is attributable to lower 
costs of termination for badly matched workers. 
13 Also, it is plausible to expect that the firm is 
interested in replacing those workers who are relatively less committed and productive. '4 
According to aboye discussion, we can expect that the best workers and those more 
adverse to job turnover will obtain or stay in a permanent jobo  The less productive workers, as 
well as those who draw some benefit from sporadic work, will be found in temporary contracts. 
Although permanent employment is rationed, the number of permanent employees is not fixed. 
Also, an efficient procedure for allocating heterogeneous workers among permanent and 
temporary jobs may be at work. 
We can  identify the "primary sector" as that composed of permanent jobs and the 
in the future (Hall  1972). 
12 For those workers who have a lower alternative wage, availability of unemployment insurance 
can reduce the opponunity cost of unemployment, making periods of joblessness attractive. That 
implies that some workers, even with a history of permanent employment, may find incentives in 
fixed-term contracts. 
13 If the job match affects workers' satisfaction, those workers in bad job matches are likely to 
be less satisfied, showing a consequent unwillingness to provide greater work effon. They are also 
less Iikely to have accumulated specific human capital, thus being more mobile. 
14 If severance pay is high, less productive workers will be more closely monitored by the firm 
in order to define c1ear motives for termination and prevent unfair dismissal appeals. Firms may also 
tailor a severance package for workers who agree to resigno  Another alternative applied by firms 
consists of fostering early retirement among older workers (Lazear 1981). This latter option enjoys 





"secondary sector" as that composed of temporary jobs. If the detention of shirkers is difficult in 
the primary sector and  monitoring is costless in the secondary sector (BuJow and  Summers 
1986), firms will assign temporary workers to secondary jobs and permanent workers to primary 
jobs. Permanent workers will enjoyan internallabor market and their wages will grow with job 
tenure.  On the other hand, temporary workers will be monitored and their wages will not benefit 
from continuous employment. The monitoring activity gives valuable information to the employer 
in  selecting the workers for permanent employment. 
Thus, the shirking model provides a rationale for identifying a dual labor market that is 
compatible with a low cost procedure to hire permanent employees.  In our case,  it stems from 
the segregation of workers between temporary and permanent employment.  16  An interesting 
feature the resulting employment structure is that primary and secondary jobs coexist in the 
same firm, although, of course, their proportions can  vary.18 This is a significant difference 
with respect to the case presented in the Iiterature by Bulow and  Summers.  Another distinction 
is that in the Bulow/Summers' model firms hire primary sector workers only from the pool of the 
unemployed. In the framework discussed here, firms recruit permanent employees mainly from 
temporary workers. This means that the existence of some secondary jobs is conditioned on 
sufficient time duration to screen the workers who hold those jobs. 
A potential problem in structuring primary (permanent) and secondary (temporary) jobs in 
the same firm is that eventual hierarchical differences in pay and  working conditions can foster 
bad relations among workers. Temporary workers (secondary job holders) may choose to file 
grievance claiming discrimination. Yet the firm is not whoJly vulnerable to such complaints given 
the inherent short-term duration of fixed-term contracts under law. Moreover, fixed-term workers 
16  See Rebitzer and Taylor (1991) for a model of dual labor markets in which, by introducing 
uncertain product demand in the analysis of the firm's demand for labor, primary and  secondary 
(contingent) workers can coexist in the same enterprise. 
18  Firms can  link the nature of the contract the worker is offered to the characteristics of the 
tasks or occupations to be performed. That may be based exclusively on criteria of efficiency. It is 
evident that all  firms have  managerial  positions which are  vital to their survival.  Motivation and 
commitment are indispensable attributes of the workers who most Iikely fill those positions under 
the status of permanent employment. 9 
have the option of becoming permanent employees. Any ensuing conflict not only curtails their 
permanency, but hastens their unemployment. 
11 
In the following sections, we examine and compare the characteristics of temporary and 
permanent workers. Also, we analyze temporary/permanent workers' wage differentials. After 
that, we offer some evidence of fixed-term contract effects on firms' productivity. Finally, we 
study the probability of temporary workers in obtaining a permanent jobo 
3. How Many and Who Are the Temporary Workers? 
Since 1987, the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA)  reports whether the employment 
contract is permanent or temporary, and distinguishes three different types of fixed-term 
employment arrangements: (1)  training or apprenticeship contracts, (2)  seasonal contracts and 
(3)  other contracts which include those under the EPP.  This latter distinction is crucial to 
(­
evaluate the impact of the new labor law on the Spanish labor market. Contract types (1)  and 
(2)  were first introduced in Spain by the Worker Statute of 1980. The real  institutional change 
brought about by the Worker Statute reform in  1984 consists of allowing firms to hire workers 
on a temporary basis, regardless of the nature of the job to be performed. Since such a reform 
was enacted by the end of 1984 and it enforced that the maximum duration of a fixed-term 
contract plus its renewals cannot exceed three years, our analysis focuses on workers who have 
been in their current job for three years or less. 
e 
Table 1 contains the distribution of workers by type of contract and job tenure in  1987 
and in  1990. Some results should be emphasized:  (a)  The proportion of workers with other 
fixed-term contracts has increased over time and the proportion of seasonal  and  permanent 
workers has diminished. (b) After the first six months, the proportion of permanent workers rises 
sharply with job tenure. For instance, in 1990, only 14.8% of workers with less than three 
months of job tenure enjoyed a permanent employment relationship; the figure climbed to 61 % 
11  Almost no firm hires a temporary worker for the maximum period allowed at first instance. 
Most contracts under the Employment Promotion Program are for the minimum reQuired  duration 
of six months, or three months in the case of training and apprenticeship contracts. This is induced 
by the same law. See note 3. 10 
( 
for workers who had been in the current job for 24-35 months, although few reach that length 
of permanency in the firmo  The entire increase in the referred fraction of permanent workers 
stems from temporary workers becoming permanent employees after two years in the same jobo 
As indicated by the number of workers in each job-tenure interval (Table  1),  many temporary 
employment relationships are terminated long before two years of continuous employment. 
( 
Moreover, note the cohort effect. Namely, the workers who entered employment earlier were 
more likely to get permanent jobs than those who have been employed more recently. 
It is evident that, after the legal provision for fixed-term contracts, very few newly hired 
(  workers obtain a permanent jobo  In  1990, about 90% of workers who had been in the current 
job for less than one month had a fixed-term contract. 
18  Such a trend showed to be similar for 
males and females,  as well as for private and public sector workers. 
The former findings point to a high level of turnover among temporary workers, and 
( 
sugge.st that most temporary employment relationships terminate long before the maximum 
duration allowed by law. Most workers who stay with a firm beyond one or two years have 
achieved a permanent employment status, either upon entry into the firm or at the expiration of 
their fixed-term contracto 
When addressing the question of who the temporary workers are,  we must account for 
duration of the current jobo  The reason for thjs js that, as indicated earlier, there is a selection 
into permanent employment along job tenure tracks. Thus, some workers who are temporary on 
early stage of their job tenure, later become permanent. That is partly due to firms' use of fixed­
term contracts as a screening device. If we are to compare temporary and permanent workers, 
by considering workers with different job tenures we take into consideration the fact that some 
18 Under the Employment Promotion Program, a worker cannot remain in the same firm under 
a fixed-term contract for more than three years. The EPA statistics show some temporary workers 
with over three years of  job tenure who are mostly seasonal workers. However, the law permits that 
after three years of a temporary employment relationship with a firm, a worker can  return to the 
same firm with the same employment status once a year has passed. 11 
workers may have changed their employment arrangements with the same firmo 19 
Table 2 shows probit estimates of the likelihood of being a temporary worker in  1987 
and  in  1990. In each year, two samples are considered, according to current job tenure. It 
appears that females, nonhousehold heads, less educated employees and  workers under thirty 
years of age are more likely to be hired under a fixed-term contract than other comparable 
workers.
20 These demographic characteristics among workers mesh with those indicated in the 
literature as generally pertaining to secondary sector workers. 
The effects of gender, household status, education and age on the type of employment 
relationship become more significant as we analyze samples of the most recent year. These  e 
results indicate that demographic differences between temporary and  permanent employees 
have been enhanced over time. One explanation for this may be that, in the beginning of the 
economic recovery, most long-term unemployed workers accepted the first job offer. As the job 
e 
creation process continued, some temporary workers could improved their job match by senling 
into permanent employment. As a result, our estimation of the probability of being under a fixed­
term contract is affected by the probability of having remained in such type of employment 
relationship. If this laner probability is higher for females,  nonhousehold heads,  less educated 
and younger workers the results we have obtained follow. Unfortunately, we cannot test this 
further because we do not have individual transition data available. Another explanation could be 
that firms, in their process of sorting out workers between permanent and temporary 
employment, have shown less preferences over time for workers with the mentioned 
characteristics as well as other traits which are not observed but are correlated with those. 
19 Of course, some permanent workers with a specific firm might have been hired under a fixed­
term contract by a previous firmo  This case raises the ¡ssue of inter-firm mobility and job matching 
in an economy with two regimes of working arrangements, and calls for a more dynamic approach 
to temporary employment. 
20  We  estimated the probit specifications contained in Table  2 on  samples where temporary 
workers hired under training/apprenticeship or seasonal contracts basis were excluded and found 
similar results to those reported. e
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4. Do Temporary Workers Eam Less than Permanent Workers7 
Inquiries ¡nto the earning differential between temporary and  permanent workers can 
reveal crucial aspects of the employment relationship in Spain.  It js evident that fixed-duration 
jobs preclude any wage growth that otherwise stems form continuous employment. How does 
experience and job tenure affect earnings among temporary and permanent workers?  Do age­
earning profiles differ between them7 Among newly hired workers, are those in temporary status 
compensated for their job instability7 In the context of the long-term employment incentive 
model (Lazear  1981), is compensation of temporary workers more related to productivity than is 
(  compensation of permanent workers7 
If some unobserved characteristics among workers affect wages and  are correlated with 
the types of contracts they have,  we may find it difficult to obtain an efficient estimate of the 
type-of-contract effect on earnings when running an OlS fully specified wage equation. Our 
(1 
previous analysis suggests that the correlation between workers' unobserved characteristics and 
the types of contracts under which they are employed is likely to be higher the greater the job 
tenure is among the sample of workers analyzed. Thus, by considering a sample of very low 
(  tenured workers, we might be able to correct for part of the bias in the effect of type-of-contract 
on earnings.
21 
Graph  1 shows age-earnings profile of permanent and temporary workers. The age­
earnings profile of permanent workers has the typical concave shape, whereas the age-earnings 
profile of temporary workers is almost flat for those aged  20 and over. This result is  an 
indication of the lack of professional career among temporary workers. 
e 
21  Wages may increase with job tenure for permanent workers but not for temporary workers. 
Is this a result of unobserved heterogeneity7 Firms may provide incentives by increasing wages of 
permanent workers in order to retain those who have been singled out for best performance. The 
incentive  effect  spills  over  to temporary  workers  as  they  find  permanent  employment  more 
attractive. Thus, the employer can elicit greater effort from temporary workers if they are promised 
permanent employment upon higher performance. See section  11. 13 
Estimation of Earning Eguations by Using the EPA 
Table 3 contains the results of estimated wage equations for temporary and  permanent 
workers. eolumns 1 and  2 indicate that the returns to household status, experience and 
education are higher among permanent workers. eolumns 3,  4 and  5 give simple estimations of 
the returns to job tenure. Among wage and salary workers in the public sector, the rate of return 
to job tenure is increasing but is not significantly different from zero by conventional levels of 
signification. Among wage and salary workers in the private sector, the rate of return to tenure 
significantly diverts from zero,  but only for workers who have been in the job for 12·15 years, in 
(  which case the rate of return is 20%; and for those working in the same job for 16-20 years, 
with arate of return to tenure of 17%.22 An entire sample size of less than 2,000 workers 
implies that theses estimates are measured with much error and,  hence, some of them are not 
significantly different from zero. 
Table 4 provides estímates of the wage differential between temporary (three sub­
categoríes) and permanent workers. When the entire sample of wage and salary workers is 
considered, controlling for demographic and some job characteristics, temporary workers under a 
training or apprenticeship contract earn about 24% less than permanent workers. Seasonal 
workers earn  23% less than permanent workers, and other temporary workers (the majority of 
those with a fixed-term contract) earn  12% less than permanent workers. The former 
differentials diminish when lower tenure workers are considered (column 3). An insignificant 
wage gap is found among workers who have retained their job for less than one year (column 4). 
When we look at workers aged 30 or less we only find a significant difference in wages 
between seasonal and permanent workers (column 2).23 
( 
Our results indicate that when we look at less experienced and lower job-tenured 
workers, the temporary/permanent wage gap disappears, although the lack of precision in these 
22  When sector dummies were not included, the returns to tenure were substantially higher. 
23  When workers under 26 years of age were considered, none of the three types of temporary 
employment  contracts  shows  a  significant  wage  gap  with  respect  to  indefinite  employment 
contracts. 14 
( 
estimates is a contributing factor of their insignificance. Moreover, the low rate of returns to 
tenure, once we control for observed heterogeneity, among worker who have been in the job for 
fewer than 8 years suggests that the wage differential between temporary and  permanent 
workers is attributable to unobserved heterogeneity rather than to differences in  productivity or 
to wage discrimination. The sources of unobserved heterogeneity can  be workers' quality and 
job characteristics. 
24 
Since job tenure does not seem to be a significant source of wage growth among 
permanent workers, the hypothesis that a temporary worker should earn  less than a comparable 
permanent worker, even  with the same job tenure, seems implausible. None the less, these  (\ 
results on relative wages of temporary to permanent workers have to be taken cautiously, given 
the sample size. 
Estimation of Earning Eguatjons by Vsing the NCGE 
Table 5 reflects the results of estimated wage equations by using a sample of medium 
and  large sized-firms drawn from the survey "La Negociación Colectiva en  las Grandes 
Empresas" NCGE.
26 Among this sample of medium and large-sized firms, about 12% of 
employees were under some kind of temporary employment arrangement as of June 1988. If we 
consider newly employed workers (all those hired in the previous year, regardless of how long 
they retained their jobs), the same figure climbs to 70.6%. 80th fractions, indicating the stock 
and the flow of temporary employees, integrate the set of independent variables in our estimated 
wage equations.
28 Also, as another explanatory variable,  we include the fraction of newly hired 
24  A small  sample size  and a deficient occupational information dissuaded us from pursuing 
further in trying to control for detailed job characteristics. 
26 The sample is composed of some 600 firms employing 200 + workers. The NCGE survey is 
carried out annually by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and  Finance.  See Alba (1991), for more 
details on this data seto 
28 Since the percentage of fixed-term contracts is lower among large-sized firms than the figure 
for the whole economy, it is often asserted that fixed-term contract growth is a phenomenon taking 
place within small-sized enterprises. This conclusion is misleading because temporary employment 
growth is  recent  and,  for obvious  reasons,  when  we  look at the relative  weight of fixed-term 15 
o
 
workers in the previous year. 
The results are reported in Table 5.  Each specification differs from one another in the 
definition of the dependent variable, the average wage.  In column 1, the firm's average wage is 
calculated as the firm's wage bill at a point in time (June  1988) divided by the firm's number of 
employees at that time. In column 2, the average wage is calculated as the total annual wage 
bill divided by the total annual number of employees. This is obtained by summing the number of 
employees each month and dividing by twelve. Finally,  in column 3, the average wage is 
calculated as the total annual wage bill divided by the total annual number of hours worked. 
The variable fraction of employees with a fixed-term contract appears to have a 
significant negative effect on average wage regardless of what definition is considered for the 
latter. Interestingly, in columns 2 and 3 we obtain a positive and significant coefficient for the 
variable fraction of fixed-term contracts among newly hired employees. 
27 
Our finding that firms with a higher fraction of temporary workers, holding other 
observed characteristics constant, paya significantly lower average wage suggests that fixed­
term contracts reduce labor costs among medium and large-sized firms in Spain.  AII  else 
remaining equal, a one standard deviation in the fraction of temporary employees reduces the 
worker-average wage by 3.2% (column 2 of Table 5)  and the hour-average wage by 3.9% 
(column 3 of Table 5).28 If more intensive temporary employment firms are not less productive, 
this finding may indicate that an improvement in firms' efficiency is associated with a more 
contracts by firms, temporary employment is higher among smaller-sized entities. To have a correct 
measure of the  relationship between the use of temporary employment and  firm size,  we must 
consider the fraction of fixed-term contracts among newly hired workers. 
27 Since this latter result is obtained only for the case in which the average wage is affected by 
the firm's labor turnover, it may be due to measurement error. In other words, our variable for the 
total annual wage bill might be a more accurate measure of the firm's labor cost than our variable 
for the total annual number .of employees is of the firm's labor use. If our measure for the firm's use 
of labor throughout the year is more downward biased in enterprises where more temporary workers 
were employed, the result mentioned in the text may be obtained. 
28 The mean (standar deviation) is .116 (.14) for the fraction of temporary employees and .704 
(.303) for the fraction of temporary employees among newly hired. 16 
intensive use of fixed-term contracts by medium and  large-sized firms in  Spain. 
5. Are Temporary Workers Less Productive? 
In the context of the framework we have discussed in section 2, temporary employment 
status does not necessarily indicate low ability of concerned workers. The reason for this is that 
some firms use fixed-term contracts as a screening devise. Thus, only workers with a history of 
temporary employment are more Iikely to be the ones of lower productivity. Had  we longitudinal 
data on wages and job characteristics, we would be able to test this by looking at earnings of 
individual workers. 
Given our data limitations, in order to answer the previous question we have to 
reformulate it as follows: Is average labor productivity lower among firms with a higher density 
of temporary employees than among other firms? To be able to answer this question we need a 
u 
clear measure for such a density. As we did in the above-estimated wage equations, one can 
use the fraction of temporary employees for that purpose. However, this fraction include 
heterogeneous labor. Some temporary workers are undergoing screening and they have 
incentives to put forth more effort to gain permanent employment; meanwhile, other temporary 
workers have long history of temporary employment and are less likely to work hard. 
In general, the proportion of fixed-term contracts that firms maintain may respond to 
efficiency criteria: heterogeneous labor is assign to perform heterogeneous tasks. The type of 
contract is a catalyst for labor allocation if the nature of the employment relationship is Iinked to 
the job performance. In a cross section of firms, their hiring strategies are Iikely to differ in 
response to their production process characteristics. If firms tend to reach their optimum fraction 
el  of temporary employees, this variable is not independent of firms' labor productivity. 
The results obtained from the wage equation estimated in the previous section can 
provide additional clues on the productivity effects of fixed-term contracts. In a model of 
compensating wage differentials, assuming that wages are perfectly correlated with productivity, 
workers who accept a temporary employment relationship should earn more than comparable 
newly hired permanent workers if fixed-term contracta are undesirable and there is no 17 
productivity gap between both types of workers.  By the contrary, we have found that the wage 
differential is favorable to permanent workers, saved for workers who have retained their job for 
less than two years and younger workers. Thus,  it seems that temporary workers are  less 
productive than permanent workers or, alternatively, that they are not less productive nor they 
occupy less desirable jobs. 
Our NCGE survey measures for workers' productivity is obtained by dividing annual sales 
and  value added by the average number of employees throughout 1988. To gauge the effect of 
fixed-term contracts on the firm's average productivity, we consider the following modified 
Cobb-Douglas production function for each firm: 
[ 1] 
where Y is output, K is capital, Lp  is the number of permanent employees,  l.¡  is the number of 
temporary employees,  ex  and  ~  are the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labor, 
respectively, and A is a constant of proportionality. The parameter c reflects differences in 
productivity between permanent and temporary labor (the ratio of the marginal products of e 
temporary to permanent workers). If c is greater than one, temporary workers are more 
productive than permanent workers; if c is less than one temporary workers are less productive 
than permanent workers. 
EQuation  [1] can be written as 
[2]  o = A K- L' (1  +  (c -llP)', 
where L = Lp  +  l.¡  is total labor, meaning that permanent and temporary workers are perfect 
substitutes in production, and  P = 1.¡/L is the fraction of temporary workers. Dividing equation 
[2] by L and taking natural logarithms, we obtain the equation to be estimated (error term 
o 
omitted): 
In  (O/L)  = In A +  ex In K +  ~-1  In L +  ~  (c-1) P + y X, 18 
where X is a vector of other relevant variables that may affect the firm's average 
productivity.29 
Table 6 contains the results of estimatíng the specified production function. The 
coefficient of the variable fraction of fixed-term employees always has a negative sign, but it 
becomes barely significant only when the dependent variable is value added per employee. 
e  Moreover, the variable fraction of temporary workers among newly hired employees obtains a 
positive and significant coefficient. When this laner variable is excluded from the regressions, 
we observe reductions in the coefficients of the variable fraction of temporary workers and, in 
neither case,  are they significant. 
These results provide some empirical evidence regarding firms' increased efficiency as  a 
consequence of using fixed-term contracts. They seem to be consistent with the results 
obtained in the previous section. One possible way to explain the positive and significant sign for 
e 
the fraction of temporary workers among newly hired employees can be that this variable is 
picking up those firms which make a more intensive use of fixed-term contracts as a screening 
devise. An alternative explanation is that, since the fraction of temporary workers among newly 
hired workers is a flow variable referred to the previous year, it bener reflects the labor 
allocation process which is facilitated by fixed-term contracts. 
These results call for a more profound study of firms' hiring strategies in Spain.  We need 
to know more precisely how jobs done by temporary workers compare to those performed by 
permanent employees. To iIIuminate the effects of fixed-term contracts on labor allocation and 
tasks assigning within the firm, we might need a case study-type approach that complements a 
more theoretical and statistical analysis. 
o 
6. How Ukely Are Temporary Workers to Get Pennanent Employment7 
Taking another step forward in our analysis, we seek to respond to the following 
questions: At what rate do temporary workers become permanent employees7 Who gets 
28  Brown  and  Medoff (1978) use  this methodology to analyze  union/non-union  productivity 
differences. 19 
(1 
permanent employment? What are the mechanisms which underlie such employment status 
transitions7 These questions address a crucial aspect in the dual labor market theory: are primary 
sector jobs rationed7 
As in the previous sections, we use two data sets to study the dynamics of the 
employment relationship in Spain.  One is a sample of medium and large-sized firms which report 
()  the evolution of all fixed-term contracts created in  1987. We know how many of those 
contracts ended,  were renewed or were converted into permanent contracts as of the years 
1987, 1988 and  1989. The other data set is the Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA),  which 
allows longitudinal analysis of individual workers. Since the outgoing fraction of the sample is el 
1/6, around 83% of the some 60,000 households can be followed from one Quarter to another, 
allowing us to analyze workers' transition between different employment and non-employment 




Firm-Based Data Set:  NCGE 
The Collective Bargaining in the Large Firms (NCGE)  survey contains information about 
()	  the duration for which the fixed-term contracts have been extended. The first panel of Table 7 
indicates the percentages of employees by duration of their fixed-term contracts in June 1988 
and June 1989. Consistent with our previous results, more than 70% of firms' employees have 
fixed-term contracts with duration that do not exceed one year.  For comparison purposes, the 
() 
second panel of Table 7 shows duration of contracts under the EPP,  as reported by the Spanish 
Institute of Employment (INEM). About 86% of such contracts were extended for ayear or less. 
Since this latter sample includes small firms, the difference between both figures may be 
e  explained by the higher propensity to hire temporary workers for shorter periods among smaller 
enterprises. 
It is clear from the two upper panels of Table 7 that fixed-term contracts are extended 
for a short period of time, although they can be renewed. We are particularly interested in their 
30  Unfortunately,  the  tapes  containing  individual  household  'information  on  flows  are  not 
available. We have used published tables by the Spanish Institute of Statistics. o
 
20 
evolution. To shed some light on this issue,  we can  use the NCGE survey, in  which firms were 
asked to indicate the evolution of all the fixed-term contracts created in  1987. The lower panel 
o 
of Table 7 shows that, in the sample of large firms, 69,805 fixed-term contracts were created in 
1987.
31  The status of those contracts in  1987, 1988 and  1989 is also reported: how many 
ended their term, were renewed or were converted into permanent contracts. 
o  Some results are to be  noted:  (1)  In  1987, 30.5% of those contracts expired, 23.6% 
were renewed and  2.6% became permanent contracts. The remaining contracts continued into 
1988. This finding is consistent with the previous conclusion that a high number of contracts 
o 
were extended for very short durations. (2)  By the end of 1989, 60% of the regional contracts 
had expired and the workers separated from their jobs; whereas only 14% of them had  been 
converted into permanent employment relationships. Since 26% of the concerned workers were 
still under fixed-term contracts as of the end of 1989, we cannot conclude that, among large 
firms, the conversion rate from temporary to permanent employment is  14%, although the final 
figure cannot be much higher. Also, note that the hazard rate of conversion into indefinite 
employment in increasing. That is, the Iikelihood of gening a permanent contract is higher as the 
o  employment relationship continues for a longer periodo 
Longitudinal pata Set:  EPA 
The  EPA  survey is carried out on a quarterly basis and contains information regarding the 
o 
types of contracts under which workers are employed. The data allow us to study workers' flow 
in and out of temporary employment. Our analysis proceeds in two stages: First, we consider all 
workers who reported to be working under a fixed-term contract in quarter t and observe their 
o  situation with respect to the labor force in quarter t + 1. Second, we focus on those workers 
who report to be working under a fixed-term contract in quarter t + 1, but not in quarter t, then 
examine their situation with respect to the labor force in quarter t. Since these two samples 
represent cross sectíons of temporary workers, we are able to measure their flow rates in and 
31  AII these contracts are newly created ones. However, we do not know whether some of the 




out of temporary employment by assessing their employment status in  various quarters of the 
year. 
Table 8 indicates the number of temporary workers as of the second, third and fourth 
quarters of 1987 and the first quarter of 1988 together with their status a quarter later in each 
case.  Some findings are noteworthy: (1) The proportion of temporary workers in the second 
o  quarter of 1987 who entered permanent employment in the following quarter is  18%. The 
percentage of temporary workers who reach  permanent employment relationships steadily 
decreases as  we consider later quarters. The figure is  12.4% among  workers under a fixed-term 
o  contract in the first quarter of 1988. (b)  The reduction in the rate of quarter t temporary workers 
who entered permanent employment in quarter t +1 translates to the increased proportion of 
those who remained with a fixed-term contracto Other relevant alternatives, unemployment and 
out of the labor force, level off to approximately 15% and  4%, respectively. We do not know 
o 
whether workers remain employed in the same firm or noto  Thus,  we cannot say that a 
temporary contract has been converted into a permanent one.  A worker may leave his or her job 
to obtain permanent employment with other firm. 
32 
o  Table 9 shows the number of workers who entered temporary employment as of the 
third and fourth quarters of 1987 and the first and second quarters of 1988, coupled with their 
status a quarter earlier in each case.  A striking result from this table is that about 38% of 
o 
workers who entered temporary employment in a particular quarter were employed in non­
temporary employment in the previous quarter. These non-temporary workers ¡nclude permanent 
wage/salary and self-employed workers. The published data we used do not allow us to 
distinguish between permanent wage/salary and  self-employed workers. Nonetheless, it is Iikely 
o 
that most of workers who reported entering temporary employment after losing a permanent job 
were permanent employees. Moreover, we do not know whether they changed their employment 
arrangement within the same firm or they lost their permanent jobo 
How do these results fit a dual labor market model?  If the decreased trend in the 
o 
32 We hope to be able to make more precise assessments of employment status transitions by 




transition from temporary to permanent employment status is confirmed when extending the 
period of our analysis through the present, this is evidence of the sorting process that the o 
temporary employment legislation is fostering in the Spanish labor market. Since fewer new jobs 
are being created and the pool of first job seekers has shrunk, the sorting process is likely to 
affect a more reduced number of workers. Still, firms will continue to replace more costly 
(1 
workers with temporary workers, some of whom will eventually become permanent workers. 
Another indication of the sorting effect of the temporary contract law is that an 
important fraction of workers who entered temporary employment relationships came from 




In this paper,  we have attempted to investigate the labor market effects of fixed-term 
employment contracts in Spain. The dual labor market theory has been useful in guiding our 
empirical approach. We stressed firms' use of temporary employment as a screening devise. The 
o  main hypothesis we have tried to test is that labor market segmentation increases as  a result of 
workers being sorted between permanent and temporary employment status. 
Some of the main results that have been obtained are summarized:  (1)  Temporary 
workers are more likely to be females, nonhosehold heads, under thirty years of age and  lower  e 
educated than comparable permanent workers. (2)  The returns to experience and to education 
are lower among temporary workers. Moreover, the latter show to have a flat age-earnings 
profile as compare to the standard concave age-earnings profile of those under permanent 
employment relationships. (3) When we looked into the wage differential between temporary and 
permanent workers, we found that the former earn significantly less than their permanent 
counterpart. This finding is consistent with the result that firms employing a higher fraction of 
temporary workers paya lower average wage.  (4) The analysis regarding the effects of 
o 
temporary employment on firms' average productivity is less conclusive. It appears that the 




productivity. This result is consistent with the sign that the same variable obtained in the wage 
equation.  (5)  The finding of a low and decreasing transition rate from temporary to permanent 
employment, around  15%, indicates that Spanish firms are very selective with regard to 
establishing permanent employment relationships.  Moreover, the fact that more than a third of 
current temporary workers held indefinite contracts previously suggests that the sorting 
mechanism indeed affects the entire labor force. 
Although the evidence indicates that a process of enhanced segmentation is taking place 
in the Spanish labor market, some Iimitations of our study should be emphasized.  First, we have 
been unable to learn who are the workers that obtain permanent employment. Lack of 
appropriate data prevented us from analyzing the crucial issue of how fixed-term employment 
experience affects the Iikelihood of landing in a permanent job, nor could we assess the degree 
of permanency associated with that jobo  Second, we need to know more about the firm's 
behavior as to the use of fixed-term contracts. That would iIIuminate the nature of temporary 
contracts effects on productivity at firm level. Third, it can  be argued that we are looking at an 
incomplete picture. In other words, more time is required for the economy to enter a long-term 
path in which temporary employment will start to decline. However, seven years have passed 
since the fixed-term employment contracts legislation was enacted and the percentage of 
temporary workers has not ceased to rise,  in spite of a slow down in the creation of new jobs. A 
more sluggish economy is unlikely to reverse the trend in the growth of temporary employment, 
unless it is by reductions in employment because in that case the most affected will be those 
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Table  1 
Distribution of  Workers  By  Type  of  Contract  and  Current  Job  Tenure 
EPA1s  Second  Quarter  of  each  Year
 
(Number  in  Thousands)
 
e 
Year  1987 
Current  Tenure  in  Months  Total 
Type  of  Wage/Salary 
contract  0-2  3-5  6-11  12-23  24-35  36-59  Workers 
..........----.----_ ........__ ......_-_._-_ ........__ ....._-----­ (,J  ------.----
Training/  23.5  10.8  13.2  5.9  4.0  1.0  58.4 
Apprentic.  3.8  2.9  2.8  1.2  0.7  0.1  0.7 
Seasonal  203.7  72.9  55.6  33.0  23.2  25.0  485.7 
32.9  19.6  11.9  6.8  4.0  3.4  6.2 
Other  196.2  116.3  127.9  96.6  91.4  48.1  676.6 
T~rary  31.6  31.3  27.4  19.8  15.8  6.5  8.7 
r,
'-- Permanent  196.3  171.7  269.3  351.8  461.5  670.6  6,581.5 
31.7  46.2  57.8  72.2  79.6  90.1  84.4  ---_. __._--------_. __._---_._-_...........__ .......-----_ ........•.._--_ ....
 
Total  619.7  371.8  466.0  487.2  580.1  744.7  7,802.2 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Year  1990 
Current  Tenure  in  Months  Total 
Type  of  Wage/Salary 
contract  0-2  3-5  6-11  12-23  24-35  36-59  Workers 
..._---_ .. _----_._._.-----------------------_ .._-_ ....-------_...- ------.---­ C'  Training/  18.2  14.0  13.7  11.8  4.0  .8  62.6 
Apprentic.  2.1  2.5  1.8  1.4  0.6  0.1  0.7 
Seasonal  185.3  73.8  81.0  49.3  35.2  26.5  488.3 
21.6  11.9  10.4  5.8  5.0  3.1  5.3 
Other  528.6  424.2  483.8  418.6  236.3  98.2  2,189.7 
T~rary  61.5  68.5  62.1  49.3  33.5  11.6  23.9 
Permanent  126.9  107.7  200.2  370.0  430.1  719.0  6,422.4 
14.8  17.4  25.7  43.6  61.0  85.1  70.1 
--_.---------..-.-- .. ---..........--------_ ..._..__ ..............._... _...._...
 
Total  859.0  619.7  m.7  849.7  705.6  844.5  9,163.0 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 C'
 
TlIble  2 
Probit Estimetes  of  the Likelihood  of  Being  a Temporary  Worker 
EPA's  Second  Quarter  of  1987  and  of  1990 
1 987	  1 99 O o 
< 6 Nonths  of  < 2 Years  of  < 6 Nonths  of  < 2 Years  of 
Current  Tenure  Current  Tenure  Current  Tenure  Current  Tenure 
-.------_  .. _--- ....  .....  -_ ..........  ---._ .. --- .. ----- ---_ ........ _-_ ... _-

Coeff.  Probo  Coeff.  Probo  Coeff.  Probo  Coeff.  Probo 
Constant  .6128  .3172  .9226  .7875 
(  6.38)  (  4.40)  (10.40)  (12.83) 
Femele  .0625  2.98  .0612  2.63  .0864  7.70  .0715  4.18 
(  1.24)  (  1.77)  (  1.89)  (  2.49) 
Househ.  head  -.1170  - 5.59  -.1184  - 5.09  -.1378  -12.28  -.2003  -11. 71 
(-2.01)  (-2.91)  (-2.63)  (-6.13) 
EDUCATlON: 
No  studies  .2248  10.74  .2187  9.40  .2184  19.47  .2294  13.41 
(  3.29)  (  4.31)  (  3.10)  (  4.92) 
Primery  (om; tted) 
Low-second.  -.0400  - 1.91  -.0524  - 2.25  -.0109  - 0.97  -.0184  - 1.07 
(-0.75)  ( -1.39)  (-0.20)  (-0.56) 
Upper-second.  -.1781  - 8.51  -.1281  - 5.50  -.2700  -24.07  .•  2735  -15.99 
( -2.18)  (-2.29)  (-3.64)  ( -6.01) 
Vocational  .1377  6.58  .0201  0.86  .0052  0.46  .0450  2.63 
(  1.29)  (  0.28)  (  0.06)  (  0.84) 
Vocational  2  -.0349  - 1.66  -.0332  - 1.42  -.1523  -13.57  -.1348  - 7.88 
( -0.32)  (-0.45)  (-1.68)  (-2.46) 
Univ.1st  levo  .0196  0.93  -.0072  - 0.30  -.2883  -25.70  -.3295  -19.26 
(  0.17>  ( -0.09)  (-3.02)  (-5.83) 
Univ.3  years  -.3615  -17.27  -.1583  - 6.80  -.3999  -35.65  -.2435  -14.23 
(-1.50)  (-0.95)  (-1.94)  (-1.82) 
Unlv.  degree  -.0046  - 0.21  -.0823  - 3.53  -.3726  -33.22  -.2746  -16.05 
(5  years)  (-0.03)  ( -1.07>  (-3.81)  (-4.76) 
~: 
14_19  .1274  6.08  .2754  11.83  .3093  27.57  .3550  20.76 
1.35)  (  4.16)  (  3.40)  (  6.27> 
20_24  .0869  4.15  .1770  7.60  .2149  19.16  .2467  14.42 
1.00)  (  2.91)  (  2.73)  (  5.06) 
25_29  .1279  6.11  .2007  8.62  .1333  11.88  .1496  8.74 
(  1.47>  (  3.32)  (  1.74)  (  3.16) 
30_34  -.0829  - 3.96  .0492  2.11  -.0020  - 0.17  -.0057  - 0.33 
(-0.92)  (  0.77)  (-0.02)  (-0.11) 
35_39  (omitted) 
40_44  -.0626  •  2.99  .0422  1.81  .0275  2.45  .0050  0.29 
( -0.61)  (  0.58)  (  0.29)  (  0.08) 
45_49  .0432  2.06  .0750  3.22  -.0690  - 6.15  •• 0393  - 2.29 
(  0.38)  (  0.95)  (-0.67>  (-0.63) 
50_54  .1575  7.52  .1794  7.71  -.1487  '13.25  -.0088  - 0.51', 
(  1.36)  (  2.20)  (-1.37>  (-0.12) 
55_59  .0589  2.81  .0850  3.65  -.0414  - 3.69  .0147  0.85 
(  0.45)  (  0.89)  (-0.35)  (  0.19) 
60_64  -.2491  -11.90  -.0629  - 2.70  -.2156  -19.22  -.0868  - 5.07 
(-1.55)  (-0.50)  (-1.20)  (-0.70) 
Public  .1786  8.53  .1694  7.28  -.0466  - 4.15  -.0415  - 2.42 
Sector  (  2.57>  (  3.51)  (-0.70)  (-1.02) 
Log  likel.  -2974.7  -6118.9  -3098.3  -8372.3 
N	  4,914  9,364  8,039  16,088 
" 
P	  .657  .520  .854  .753 
_._----_ ..-----.-------------_..._---_ .... ---_ .....  _--_ ..  _-----_ ... _.. _------------_. 
Note:	 Nine  sector and  17  reglon dummies  were  includld. 
t-statistlcs are presented  in parentheses e
 
Yable 3 
Wage  Equations  for  Temporary  and  Permanent  Workers 
and  Return  to Tenure  Among  Permanent  Workers 
EPA's  Second  Quarter  of  1990 
U 
Permanent  Permanent 
Temporary  Permanent  Public  Sector  Private Sector 
-----------.- ---_ ......._----....__ .......  ---------_..  --_ ... --.----.---

Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff •  t 
Const8nt  10.530  89.43  10.533  141.96  10.360  100.17  10.597 38.47  10.430  83.25 
Femele  -.18035  -3.44  -.15046  -4.00  -.11507  -3.04  -.16030  -2.95  -.08283  -1.60 
Househ.  head  .12965  2.01  .18734  4.80  .16270  4.32  .12354  2.14  .18625  3.79 
Public  sect.  .17314  2.44  .18232  5.76  .28709  7.51 
Experience  .02284  3.09  .02838  6.13  .01905  4.05  .01857  2.463  .01719  2.82 
Exper.2  -.00036  -2.59  -.00040  -5.31  -.00026  -3.41  -.00030  -2.42  -.00022  -2.33 
Education  .05365  5.87  .06354  14.84  .06065  14.05  .06913  11.57  .04843  7.81 
Part  time  -.71992  -7.92  -.63588  -9.75  -.5n06  -9.21  -.57267  -5.59  -.54187  -6.60 
TENURE: 
(Years) 
1-2  .00568  0.08  .03542  0.26  -.00930  -0.12 
3-4  .05396  0.83  .04411  0.32  .08151  1.06 
5-7  .02580  0.39  .08139  0.61  .02685  0.34 
8-11  .08854  1.40  .10164  0.79  .09556  1.24 
12-15  .17448  2.71  .16269  1.22  .20523  2.66 
16-20  .17102  2.66  .19644  1.44  .17915  2.36 
>-21  .10381  1.54  .21840  1.60  .09961  1.22 
Adj  R-square  .36  .46  .52  .51  .46 
N  358  860  860  275  580 
.Note:  The  last three regressions  include 9 sector dummies. 
(, C 
Tabl.4 
Permenent/Temporary  Workers  Wage  Differential 
EPA's  Second  Quarter  of  1990 
CJ 
All  Wage  and 
Salary Workers 
.............. 
Coeff.  t 
30  or  Fewer 
Years  of  Age ..••........__ . 
Coeff.  t 
Less  than  4 
Years  of  Tenure 
. ............. 
Coeff.  t 
Less  than  2 
Years  of  Tenure 
. .........._----
Coeff.  t 
Constent  10.4744  131.52  10.1498  53.27  10.4609  84.65  10.4081  70.97 
O 
Femele 

















Experience  .021530  5.71  .055448  2.61  .023276  3.n  .025325  3.49 
Exper.2  -.000321  -5.05  -.001 109  -1. 11  -.000322  -2.71  -.000355  -2.58 
Education  .059356  15.04  .082540  8.36  .065451  8.66  .071864  7.32 




























Publfc  sector  .253934  7.25  .256758  3.21  .252930  3.51  .238174  2.53 
Tenure  .001143  3.34  .001515  0.91  -.00006  -0.01  -.003650  -0.16 
Tenure2  -1.  7e-06  -2.21  -5.5e-06  -0.58  .000067  0.41  .000308  0.18 
Part  time  -.636293  -11. 75  -.612164  -6.34  -.682770  -8.52  -.673144  -6.56 


















Wage  Effect  of  Fixed-Term  Contracts at  Firm  Level 
Wage  Equation  Estimates 
NCGE,  1989. 
(1) 
------.------. 
Coeff.  t 
(2) 
-----_ ......... 
Coeff.  t 
(3) .- .... _------_ .. 
Coeff.  t 
Constant  6.95519  66.02  7.17173  60.44  6.68373  55.76 
Log  firm  size  .01768  2.00  .02279  2.29  .02915  2.91 
Log  Capitel 
per  eq)loyee 
.04051  5.19  .04742  5.44  .04572  5.19 
Util.  Instalations  .08942  1.83  .14715  2.68  .13549  2.44 
Foreign  .05524  2.43  .05062  1.98  .04630  1.79 
Publ ic  .00925  0.30  .03396  1.00  .05625  1.64 
Fraction of  -.08562  -1.95  -.06294  -1.27  -.07764  -1.55 
nellly  hired 
Fraction  temporary 
eq)loyees 
-.20596  -2.55  -.22752  -2.50  -.28188  -3.07 
Fraction  teq).  eq)l.  .01445  0.45  .07165  2.04  .07005  1.97 
among  nelll y hi red 
Fraction high-level  .90487  10.06  .98350  9.72  .91772  8.98 
managers 
Fraction mediun­ .57699  9.27  .56082  8.02  .54096  7.66 
lower-level  managers 




.09705  3.00  .05963  1.64  .07233  1.97 
ccoo  majority  in 
bargaining  table 
-.05165  -2.76  -.05879  -2.79  -.05767  -2.71 
UGT  majority in  -.06770  -3.25  -.07907  -3.37  -.08011  -3.37 
bargaining  table 








Note:  All  the  regressions  include 8 sector dummies.
 
The  dependent  variable is defined as follows:  in column  (1)  the  firm's  wage
 
bill at a  point  in time  divided by the  flrm's  number  of  eq)loyees at that  time;
 
in column  (2)  the firm's  total annull  wage  bill divided  by the firm's average
 
nunber  of  eq)loyees  throughout  1988;  in  column  (3)  the  firm's total  annuel  lIage
 
bill divided by  the  firm's average  number  of  hours  worked  throughout  1988.
 Teble 6 
Productivity Effect  of  Fixed-Term  Contracts at  Firm  Level 
Production  Function  Estimates 
NCGE,  1989 
Dependent  Variable:  Log  Sales per  Employee  Log  Value  Adcled  per  Employee 
Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coaff.  t  Coeff.  t 
Constent  -4.11312  -0.96  -4.12439  -0.96  -5.87113  -1.38  -5.84383  -1.36 
Log  firm  size  -.25088  -6.65  -.25179  -6.65  -.21280  -5.63  -.21368  -5.61 
(-\1 
'-,  Log  Capitel  .24491  10.36  .24598  10.37  .23645  9.96  •23n8  9.94 
Log  hours  worked  1.47521  2.57  1.49302  2.59  1.59583  2.78  1.61505  2.79 
Util.  Instalations  .26331  1.76  .26135  1.74  .42690  2.87  .42491  2.83 
Foraign  .17061  2.47  .18550  2.68  .18012  2.61  .20155  2.91 
Public  -.06689  -O. n  -•10536  -1. 15  -.03570  -0.38  ".08991  -0.97 
Fraction exported  .18639  1.33  .20318  1.44  .09666  0.69  .12051  0.85 
Fraction of  -•13987  -lo04  -.13686  -1.01  -.02716  -0.20  -.02376  -0.17 
newly  hired 
Fractfon  temporary  -.14440  -0.58  -.03618  -0.14  -.42437  -1.70  -.26661  -1. 08 
employees 
Fraction  temp.  empl  .21090  2.22  .30104  3.17 
among  newly  hired 
Fraction high-level  1.17649  4.25  1.1722  4.22  1.09275  3.80  1.08979  3.76 
managers 
Fraction medfun- 1.18848  6.23  1. 156n  6.06  .64505  3.34  .60531  3.12 
lower-level  manager  s 
Fraction clerical  1.25134  4.18  1.28941  4.30  .80689  2.66  .85489  2.80 
workers 
Fraction sharing  .05329  0.54  .05751  0.58  .12225  1.26  .12862  1.31 
profft 
ccoo  majority  in  -.06680  -1. 17  -.06810  -1.19  -.08708  -1.52  -.08821  -1.53 (  bargafning  table 
UGT  majority  in  -.06737  -1.06  -.07525  -1.18  -•12305  -1.93  -.13425  -2.09 
bargaining  table 
Adj  R-square  .47  .46  .41  .40 
N  593  593  584  584 





Distribution of  Fixed-Term  Contracts  by  Duration 
1988  1989 
< 6  Months  35.90  31.17 
>"6  <  1 Year  35.36  40.80 
>"'1  <  2 Years  16.13  17.04 
>=2  Years  12.61  10.44 
Total  100.00  100.00 
NlJllber  83,747  105,271 
Source:  NCGE. 
1989 
3  months  25.9 
4-6  months  49.5 
7-12  months  10.7 
>12  months  13.9 
Source:  MTSS.  ¡NEM.  (Evaluación de  programes). 
T8ble 7.b 
Evolution of  69,805  Temporary  Contracts Created  in  1987 
1987  1988  1989 
Expired  21,264  15,431  5,473 
Renewed  16,507  13,484  11,557 
Converted  i nto 
indefinite 
1,811  3,942  3,941 
Source:  NCGE. o
 
Table  8 
Current  Quarter's  Labor  Force  Status of Temporary  Workers  in  the Previous  Quarter 
Number  in  Thousands 
Initial  TOTAL  Employed  Unempl.  Out  of  Other 
Quarter  L.F. 
Number  %  Perman.  Tempor. 
2/87  828.6  100  18.00  59.39  15.61  3.77  3.22 
3/87  1042.6  100  16.06  60.86  16.53  4.17  2.39 
4/87  1146.1  100  14.98  65.93  13.64  3.00  2.46 
1188  1214.9  100  12.41  68.38  13.03  4.11  2.07 
()  Source:  EPA.  Estad(stica de  Flujos.  Madrid:  INE,  1989. 
el e
 
Table  9 
Previous 
Number 
Cuarter's  Labor 
in  Thousands 
Force  Status of Current  Temporary  Workers 
(  '  J 
Employed 
Non-Tempor. 
First  Job 
Seeker 
Unemployed 
with  E~per. 






















Other  1.41  1.92  1.48  1.90 
TOTAL  %  100  100  100  100 
e! 
Number  516.5  449.2  456 
Note:  Temporary  workers  in  the previous  quarter  are  excluded. 
Source:  EPA.  Estad(stica de  Flujos.  Madrid:  INE,  1989. 
472 o￿ 
o￿  AH  Workers  +  Permanent  Contract 
o￿  Temporary  Contract 
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